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ABSTRACT 
In Sahelian countries, non-religious public education systems prevent the inclusion of 
religious teaching in public schools, which is relegated to the informal sector. This 
article is a first attempt to quantitatively study how this dual educational system works 
and whether the potential competition between both systems is a key factor for low 
primary school enrollment in Senegal. The analysis is based on a unique national 
dataset with detailed information on formal and Koranic schooling of 5 to 21 year-old 
children covering 1800 households. In our sample, over half of the girls and 60% of 
the boys attend Koranic school, but the majority only for 2 or 3 years. After giving a 
brief  background  on  Islam  and  Koranic  schools  in  Senegal,  to  better  grasp  the 
complexity of the subject,  we study the determinants of Koranic schooling before 
analyzing its compatibility with formal schooling. A descriptive analysis shows that 
children who attended for a few years Koranic school have a higher probability of 
attending formal primary school than those who haven‟t been to Koranic school at all 
and  those  who  attended  higher  Koranic  studies.  However,  this  apparent 
complementarity vanishes and even in some cases turns into significant substitutability 
after duly instrumenting formal school attendance with school openings. This tends to 
prove  that  the  coordination  between  the  acquisition  of  formal  human  capital  and 
religious  knowledge  is  one  of  the  challenges  faced  by  Senegal  in  achieving 
Millennium Development Goals. 
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In  mainly  Muslim  Sahelian  countries,  non-religious  public  education  systems  prevent  the 
inclusion  of  religious  teaching  in  public  schools,  relegating  it  to  the  informal  sector.  Those 
countries display among the lowest primary school enrollments in the world and have informal 
Koranic schools. After reviewing the specificity of Islam in Senegal as well as the functioning of 
Koranic schools, this paper studies the duality of the Senegalese education system, and assesses 
whether this duality is a relevant explanation for the low primary school enrollments. 
Islam in Senegal 
Muslims represent 94%
1 of the Senegalese population. Coming from North -Africa in the 10
th 
century, Islam was rather, in the beginning, the religion of the elite along the trans-Saharan 
trading routes
2. Massive conversions took place in the 19
th century through all layers of society 
to fuel the army of “Jihads” against the European colonizers and non-Muslim states
3. 
Most  Senegalese Muslims  (90%)  are members of Sufi brotherhoods (known in Arabic as 
“tariqah”, “confr￩rie” in French). Sufi represents a mystic branch of Islam: followers seek the 
ultimate truth through spiritual practices and asceticism. A master (“marabout” in Senegalese 
French,  “shaykh”  in  both  Arabic  and  Wolof)  teaches  his  method  (“tariqah”  means  “way”, 
“path”) to his disciple. This master-disciple relationship is common to all Sufi brotherhoods, but 
the type of this relationship and its intensity depends on the brotherhood. There are four main 
Islamic brotherhoods in Senegal: Tijanyyah (50%), Muridiyyah (30%), Qadiriyyah (10%) and 
finally the Layene brotherhood which represents a minority
4 very concentrated around Yoff, a 
suburb of Dakar. The figures given here are rough estimates as there are no official sources, and 
it  is  highly  instrum ented  as  each  brotherhood  claims  to  have  many  disciples .  There  is  a 
consensus however that Tijanes and Murids are the two main ones, with a slight numerical 
advantage for the Tijanes.   
                                                 
1 Source: CIA - The World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html 
2 See for instance Robinson (2004). 
3 Led by El Hadj Umar Tall, cf. Robinson (1985). 
4 This brotherhood can mainly be found among the small Lebu ethnic group who are Wolof-speaking fishermen. 3 
 
Both Tijanyyah and Qadiriyyah were imported by pilgrims earlier and spread throughout the 
region. The Tijanyyah originates from Algeria in the 18
th century, and came to Senegal in the 
early  19
th  century.  Originally  introduced  by  the  Haalpulaar
5, who brought it to neighboring 
regions, it was rapidly controlled by the Wolof
6. This explains its dominance as they are the two 
main ethnic groups. The Qadiriyyah is known to be the most orthodox one, and represents 
nowadays only a small fraction of the Muslims, mainly in the South. On the opposite, Muridism 
and the Layene brotherhood are strictly Senegalese brotherhoods.  
Muridism
7 is deeply embedded in Wolof society. Originally a rural movement from the Baol 
region
8, it spread throughout the urban centers. Though believed to be second in size, they are 
the most active, particularly s uccessful in attracting the urban youth
9. Nowadays, portraits of 
their founder can be found all over the walls of Dakar. The attractiveness of this brotherhood 
seems to be due to how well it adapted to the local social context. Sy (1980) mentions that in the 
19
th  century,  Muridism  appeared  as  a  reaction  towards  both  colonial  influence  and  the   
hierarchical Wolof society
10. By attracting at first mainly the low-status slaves, castés, and poor 
peasants, it responded to an aspiration to a more egalitarian society. In the end, the privileged ties 
between the master and his disciples  somehow replaced the submission to former masters. The 
disciple pledges allegiance to a master: “I submit myself to  you with my body and soul"
11. 
Another  specificity  of  the  brotherhood  is  to  place  work  for  the  master  at  the  center:  in  the 
country side, the disciples would work once a week on the shaykh‟s field
12. The first Murid 
migrants  arriving to  Dakar felt the need to  gather  as  they  were still a minority in a Tijane 
environment
13. Some reorganization took place, replacing disciple‟s work by monetary support. 
Tuba, their holy center, is an impressive illustration of the economic success of the brotherhood: 
the modern city rose in the middle of the peanut fields. It was developed by remittances from 
                                                 
5 More commonly known as “Toucouleurs” or “Tukulors”. 
6 Its capital is in Tivaouane, in Thiès Region. 
7 Founded in 1885 by Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba 
8 It is located around Kaloack and refers to a former Wolof state. 
9 As already noted in Diop (1981) this clear strategy announces the hegemony of the brotherhood.  
10 Indeed as in many ethnic groups of the region, the traditional society  is divided into “free-men” (sometimes 
confusingly called “nobles”), “cast￩s” (craftsmen, musicians) and former slaves. 
11 Cf. Cruise O‟Brien (1970). The ceremony of obedience is perceived by Tijanes as heretic as it implies that the 
master has divine power. Indeed there exists a great competition between the two main brotherhoods.  
12 Unique among Muslims, a sub-group of Murids called Baye Fall, are even exempted from their 5 daily prayers, as 
working on their master‟s field is their way to worship God. 
13 Cf. Diop (1980). 4 
 
disciples all around the world and is now the second agglomeration in Senegal, with more than 
450 000 inhabitants in 2002
14. 
The country is renowned for its tolerant Islam, though recently, a new Islamist movement locally 
known as “Ibadou”
15 has been spreading throughout the urban elite. Their success can be easily 
measured by the growing number of veiled young university women. As far as we know, no 
reliable source gives precise idea of the importance of the phenomenon
16. 
 
Islamic schools in Senegal 
As in many other Muslim countries, public schools offer none or few religious education
17, so 
children are sent to (informal) Koranic school. Given the specificity of the practice of Islam in 
this region, we give now a short presentation of Koranic sch ools in Senegal. Often only 
perceived as an institution that put children in the streets begging, Koranic  school encompasses 
in fact a broader reality. 
It is also very difficult to have reliable data on Koranic schools in Senegal. In reality, there exists 
a great variety of forms too, from informal village schools to more formal Franco -Arab schools. 
There is no rigid structure of informal Koranic schools in Senegal as elsewhere in the region, but 
three levels can be distinguished
18: 
  The primary level: once children are able to speak, typically between 3 and 5, they are 
often sent to Koranic school where they are taught basic knowledge of Koran.  
  The  secondary  level:  then,  among  those  who  have  memorized  large  portions  of  the 
Koran, some of children are taught “Islamic science”, i.e. translating the holy book, the 
written traditions of the religion 
                                                 
14 According to the Population census 
15 “Ibadou Rahmane” means “the servants of the Merciful”. 
16 Villaleon (2004) cites a sociologic study estimating between 5 and 10% the proportion of veiled women on 
university campuses. 
17 Though there are recently some attempts to include Koranic studies in the curriculum, cf. Charlier (2002), if is not 
yet the case that both systems are integrated. Some (private) schools called “Franco-Arab” schools do present both 
programs. We will come back to this point later on. 
18 Following World Bank (1999). 5 
 
  Higher  studies:  a  few  selected  students  will  proceed  beyond  this  level  usually  with 
famous masters and often in famous Islamic university in North Africa or other Muslim 
countries
19. 
Of course this description is rather subjective, e.g., Gandolfi (2003) differentiates five levels sub-
dividing the first two levels mentioned earlier in two sub-levels. However this structure appears 
to be very similar in many Muslim Sub-Saharan regions. 
The first two levels (denoted here as primary and secondary level) are locally known as “￩coles 
coraniques” in French, “daara” in Wolof. This elementary teaching begins with learning by heart 
the Koran without understanding it, so that one may wonder which skills are transmitted. Though 
they are taught to read and write Koranic verses, alumni rarely master Arabic language. The 
ultimate aim of this school is to prepare the student to become a good Muslim
20. The main values 
transmitted are obedience, respect, and submission. Pedagogy‟s strategies may include physical 
punishments  and  often  begging  for  food,  which  allows  students  to  experience  humility  and 
solidarity, both highly valued in Sufi Islam
21. 
In the same spirit, it is also believed that c hildren would learn more being away from their 
parents, who would not interfere with the master‟s strict discipline
22. In this case, as traditional 
Koranic schools are usually tuition-free and provided Koranic masters cannot afford to feed all 
his students, they would be fed by the neighbors
23. It is indeed a common practice that some 
families are informally assigned to feed some Koranic students . In some areas (and downtown 
Dakar especially) it is very common to see Koranic students begging for food at red lights.  
The practice of child fosterage is widespread in West -Africa. It is nevertheless very difficult to 
get precise estimates of  the number of children fostered  by Koranic masters. Children‟s rights 
advocates tend to instrument these figures to alarm public opinion and officials, since children 
fostered to the Koranic master are often in a very deprived situation. Perry (2004) analyses the 
                                                 
19 Gandolfi (2003) mentions Cairo, The Mecca, Fez, etc. 
20 “A believer, a perfect man” in Gandolfi (2003)‟s words. 
21 As it is certainly not always the case, the violence exerted on the Koranic students by their master  is somehow 
tolerated as part of the normal treatment cf. Sy (1980) and the first pages in Kane‟s “Ambiguous Adventure” famous 
novel  
22 See Perry (2004). 
23 Food given to talibes is believed to be mandatory charity for Muslims. 6 
 
discrepancy between their discourse and the experience of the local population
24. The media‟s 
focus is often on the urban “talib￩s” (Koranic school students in Wolof
25) begging in the streets 
of business districts or touristic areas with tin cans, dressed in rags and in poor health conditions. 
Accounts of Koranic masters exploiting his talibes by forcing them to collect a  certain amount 
per day with the threat of physical punishments are often echoed in the local press and internet
26. 
Former talibes who have fled from their harsh masters often become street children. UNICEF 
estimates that 100,000 children are begging in Sen egal
27 and Understanding Children’s Work
28 
(2007) estimates that 90% of begging children in Senegal are talibes.  
However, children fostered by Koranic masters represent only a minority of Koranic students in 
Senegal. Many primary school students attend simultaneously Koranic school either after school 
or  during  vacations.  Usually  they  will  only  learn  basic  knowledge  to  be  able  to  recite  the 
prayers
29. 
As  traditional  Koranic  schools  don‟t  have  any  precise  timetable  or  curricula  as  the  formal 
education system does, there is no guaranty of the quality of the teaching, but there have been 
attempts to modernize them. The most significant one has been the development of Franco-Arab 
schools (“￩cole franco-arabe” similar to “madrasa” in other contexts) since 1950‟s with a recent 
growth in the 2000‟s
30, trying to reconcile formal and religious schooling. Franco-Arab schools 
are excluded from this paper, and considered as formal education. Indeed, in some Franco-Arab 
schools,  pupils  take  the  same  exams  as  in  public  formal  schools,  so  those  schools  are 
undoubtedly formal ones. 
                                                 
24 Her work is based on a small-scale study among rural Wolof Tijane. 
25 Even though, there is a confusion, as it rather refers to disciple in the broad sense, and therefore any Murid 
follower  
26 One example could be: http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=50001 
27 http://www.unicef.org/protection/senegal_34961.html 
28 Inter-Agency Research Cooperation Project on child labor implying ILO, UNICEF and World Bank. 
29 Gandolfi (2003) 
30 Ibid. 7 
 
In  Dakar,  many  pre-school  Islamic  institutions  have  emerged,  providing  an  alternative  to 
traditional Koranic schools. The biggest difference between both systems is that these modern 
institutions have relatively high fees
31.  
 
Is there any competition with (formal) primary schools? 
Senegal is part of the Education For All (EFA) UN Programme, targeting universal primary 
education, which is part of the Millennium Development Goals. Universal primary education is 
far from being achieved with 70% of primary school gross enrollment rate in 2002
32. If supply-
side issues are certainly a key barrier for access to education, demand -side issues are also 
believed to play an important role. When benefits from formal  schooling are not perceived by 
uneducated parents, the motivation to send children to school is low. On the contrary, sending 
children to Koranic school may be the result of higher perceived returns. The economic success 
of the Murids for instance makes Ko ranic schooling more attractive and  potentially useful to 
benefit from the brotherhood‟s powerful network in the informal sector
33 and in illegal migration 
channels
34. In addition, some Senegalese consider the public system of formal education as  a 
heritage of colonization, and by contrast, Koranic school as closer to Senegalese traditions
35.  As 
mentioned earlier though, it may not necessarily be the case that both systems are in competition, 
since many children are sent to Koranic  school after their (formal) schooldays (and week-ends 
and vacations). Hence both types of educations are theoretically compatible. 
Despite their pervasive influence in contemporary Senegal, Koranic schools have been neglected 
by  development  planners.  This  article  is  to  our  knowledge   the  first  attempt  to  study 
quantitatively links between the two types of schooling and the potential substitut abilities or 
complementarities thanks to a unique data set on  education with information on  Koranic (and 
formal) schooling in Senegal. As there a re many similarities in Koranic schooling throughout 
                                                 
31 Gandolfi (2003) mentions up to 1000Fcfa a month in Dakar. 
32 According to UNESCO-UIS website: 
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Language=eng&BR_Country=6
860&BR_Region=40540 
33 World bank (1999) 
34 See for instance Lacomba (2000). 
35 See in particular Huet-Gueye and de Leonardis (2007) for a lexical and morphosyn tactical analysis of parents‟ 
social representations in the light of schooling choices for their children. Traditionalist vs. modernist views clearly 
shapes Koranic vs. formal schooling choices.   8 
 
other Sahelian countries where low primary school enrollments are encountered, to some extend 
conclusions drawn from this national survey could give some clues about the mechanisms at play 
in the neighboring countries as well. 
The  following  section  will  first  present  our  dataset  and  then  some  descriptive  statistics  on 
Koranic  school  enrollment.  After  studying  the  determinants  of  Koranic  education,  we  will 
present our empirical strategy to study the possible links between Koranic and formal schooling. 
Results and policy implications will conclude. 
   9 
 
Data and descriptive statistics on Koranic schooling 
The dataset 
In this paper, we use the EBMS
36 dataset. It is a national household survey conducted in Senegal 
in 2003 on 1800 households. The data collected contains detailed information on the schooling 
trajectory of the household members and their relatives (parents, siblings and children),  as well 
as on their living conditions: possession of durable goods, employment status, health, etc. It also 
includes  unique  (to our knowledge) information  on  Koranic schooling. For each household 
member aged between 5 and 21, we know  whether they have been enrolled in  Koranic school 
and the duration of their study.  
The EBMS  survey design  was  aimed at resurveying some of the pupils that passed school 
attainment tests during the  pre-existent PASEC Senegal survey
37. In PASEC survey,  20 pupils 
were randomly chosen among second grade pupils from 99 primary schools in 1995. 60 schools 
surveyed by PASEC were resurveyed in EBMS. In each of these schools, the maximum numbers 
of households containing at least a PASEC child (up to 20) were  surveyed. Other households 
belonging to  the community  of the school  (village or neighborhood in  urban  areas)  were 
surveyed, so that the total number of households in each community would reach 30. 
This particular sampling design has some consequences  for inferences issues. First, there is a 
school at least since 1995 in each community surveyed. As a result, we observe Koranic school 
attendance  provided  formal school  attendance is  also  possible.  This tends to underrepresent 
remote areas where there are no primary schools or only recently.  Second, some households are 
in our sample because they enrolled a ch ild in second grade during school year 1995  -  96. 
Consequently, recently composed households are probably  underrepresented  in our sample. 
Households with very low preferences for formal schooling may also be underrepresented. 
                                                 
36 EBMS is a survey on households‟ education and well-being in Senegal: “Education et Bien-être des Ménages au 
Sénégal”. 
37 PASEC is the Program of Analysis of Education System: “Programme d‟Analyse des Systèmes Educatifs de la 
CONFEMEN” (created in 1991 after Jomtien Conference on Education for All) where CONFEMEN is the oldest 
organization of the Francophonie: “Conf￩rence des Ministres de l‟Education ayant le fran￧ais en partage” from 
1960. PASEC conducted a panel survey in Senegalese primary schools between 1995 and 2000. This panel included 
notably school attainment tests. For further information on the PASEC Programme, see http://www.confemen.org/ 10 
 
In  this  section,  we  give  some  descriptive  statistics  about  Koranic  school  enrollment  in  our 
sample, and then study its determinants. 
Age when enrolled in Koranic school 
In Figure 1, we plot the proportion of children having attended Koranic school in our dataset and 
their age. In reality, there are two effects that can explain the differences between the enrollment 
rates of the older and the younger cohorts. First, in the older cohort, the proportion of children 
who have not yet attended Koranic school but will attend Koranic school in the future is smaller. 
Second, if the Koranic  school attendance decreases (or increases) with time, this affects the 
difference  of  Koranic  school  attendance  between  the  2  cohorts.  With  data  at  hand,  the  two 
mechanisms are theoretically unidentifiable. However, we observe that until the age of 11, boy 
enrollment rate increases rapidly with age, and that it increases rapidly until the age of 9 for girls. 
For  that  reason,  we  will  suppose  that  above  those  ages,  the  differences  in  Koranic  school 
enrollments are not due to future enrollment. 
Figure 1: Koranic school enrollment by age in 2003 
 
In Figure 2 below, we plot the average duration of Koranic schooling against age in 2003. In that 







































and 15 years for the girls. For that reason, we will make the following assumption: girls older 
than 15 and boys older than 18 have finished their Koranic schooling. 
Figure 2: Schooling duration in Koranic school and age in 2003
 
Koranic school duration 
In We observe that approximately half of the girls and 40% of the boys do not attend Koranic 
school. Among those who have attended Koranic school, the majority attends 2 or 3 years. Only 
15% of the girls and 27% of the boys attend Koranic school for more than 3 years. 




















































Table 1 below, we give the distribution among girls and boys of Koranic schooling duration. The 
distributions are computed among the individuals whose age ensures that Koranic schooling is 
over. For this reason, there are more girls than boys in the sample. 
We observe that approximately half of the girls and 40% of the boys do not attend Koranic 
school. Among those who have attended Koranic school, the majority attends 2 or 3 years. Only 
15% of the girls and 27% of the boys attend Koranic school for more than 3 years. 
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Table 1: Number of years in Koranic school for boys and girls 








0  49,1%  40,3% 
1  8,9%  6,9% 
2  15,8%  14,5% 
3  10,4%  11,0% 
4  5,5%  7,2% 
5  5,1%  7,8% 
6  1,7%  3,8% 
7  1,0%  1,9% 
8 or more  2,4%  6,5% 
Nb. of obs.  1752  780 
 
Determinants of Koranic schooling 
In Table 2, we estimate two different models for the determinants of Koranic school attendance. 
In columns 1 and 2, we estimate two specifications of a probit model for the determinants of 
having ever attended a Koranic school. In columns 3 and 4, we estimate the determinants of the 
number of years in Koranic school with OLS. We include in the sample all girls aged 15 or more, 
as  we  observed  in  Figure  2  that  girls  older  than  15  have  probably  finished  their  Koranic 
schooling. In Table 3, we run the same regressions for boys, above 18 years old, as according to 
previous observations, they have probably finished their Koranic schooling. 
We observe that Koranic school attendance is lower for older girls: this means that the younger 
cohorts are more likely to attend Koranic school. This is probably due to a time trend in the 
Koranic school attendance, although we do not observe a similar time trend for boys. 
Unexpectedly, controlling for other variables, we do not observe any difference in the Koranic 
schooling between urban and rural areas, neither for girls nor for boys. However, it may well be 
the case that it is captured by the wealth variable. 
Wealth is associated with a higher propensity to spend time in Koranic school. For girls, it is 
associated with a higher probability of having ever attended Koranic school and for a higher 
number of years spent in Koranic school. For boys, the coefficients for the probability of ever 14 
 
attending Koranic school are not significant. However, wealth is also associated with a higher 
average number of years spent in Koranic school. Hence, it seems that sending girls to Koranic 
school is a “luxury” that rich households only can afford. Indeed, in poorer households girls are 
more likely to be employed in heavy domestic chores which prevent them from attending school 
whether it is formal or Koranic. According to Dumas and Lambert (2006) domestic chores are 
generally the main type of child labor and it mostly concerns girls. At the same time, domestic 
chores vary greatly with household‟s equipment: Moguerou (2006) shows for instance that in 
households equipped with water access children and in particular girls are more likely to go to 
school. On the opposite, boys from any economic background are sent to Koranic schools, even 
though it seems that rich ones only can afford to pursue longer studies. 
The (formal) education of the parents is not strongly associated with Koranic schooling. For 
boys, the father‟s education is associated with a lower average duration of Koranic schooling. 
Koranic schooling is shorter for girls when the father works in the formal sector, but not for 
boys. 
The  ethnic  group  is  a  strong  determinant  of  Koranic  schooling.  The  main  ethnic  group  in 
Senegal, Wolof, taken as a reference, two ethnic groups attend significantly less Koranic school: 
Sérère and Dioola. The average number of years being between 0.5 and 1 year lower for girls 
(average: 1.6 years of schooling) and between 0.8 and 1.4 years lower for boys (average: 2.4 
years of schooling). One ethnic group attends more Koranic school for both boys  and girls, 
Soninké, and another for boys only, “Pulaar”
38 . Regressing the number of years spent in Koranic 
school on ethnic groups explains 7.9% of the variance for boys and 4.6% for girls, whereas 
regressing last grade attended on ethnic groups explains 1.4% of the variance for boys and 2.9% 
for girls. Ethnicity explains a larger part of the variance in Koranic school attendance than in 
formal school attendance. This underlies the fact that culture is probably a strong determinant of 
Koranic schooling. Although, there may be interferences with religious brotherhood effects as 
well, since ethnic group and brotherhood affiliation are related as explained in the first section.  
                                                 
38 Fulbe (“Peuls” in French) and Haalpulaar (“Toucouleurs”) are grouped together. 15 
 
The rank among siblings is another determinant of Koranic school attendance. However, there 
are information about siblings only if the mother (or father) lives in the surveyed household. For 
this reason, the sample is smaller once the number of siblings and the rank among siblings are 
introduced. We observe that sharing siblings with the same mother has an effect on the Koranic 
education of girls, and that having siblings with the same father affect the Koranic education of 
boys
39. For that reason, we include the relevant variable in Table 2 and 3. 
Older sisters have a higher Koranic  school  attendance,  and longer Koranic school duration, 
whereas older brothers have a lower Koranic school attendance. Surprisingly, attendance is lower 
in small brotherhood for boys. The number of older sisters decreases the probability of attending 
Koranic school for boys. Koranic school duration is positively affected by the number of siblings 
for girls, while it is negatively affected by the number of older brothers for boys. 
                                                 
39 Because of polygamy and frequent divorces, the correlation between the number of siblings with the same father 
and with the same mother is only 0.5 in our sample. For that reason, “sibling with the same mother” and “sibling 
with the same father” are not identical. 16 
 
Table 2: The determinants of Koranic school attendance for girls 
 








Age  -0.063  -0.058  -0.051  -0.075 
  (0.016)**  (0.017)**  (0.028)+  (0.028)** 
Rural  -0.220  -0.146  -0.159  -0.070 
  (0.138)  (0.154)  (0.225)  (0.235) 
Wealth (Possession of durable goods)  0.177  0.277  0.257  0.514 
  (0.055)**  (0.063)**  (0.087)**  (0.115)** 
Father's Education  0.031  0.052  0.005  0.025 
  (0.028)  (0.031)+  (0.051)  (0.067) 
Mother's Education  0.045  0.017  0.062  0.011 
  (0.028)  (0.034)  (0.062)  (0.064) 
The hh‟s head works in the formal sector  -0.088  -0.245  -0.338  -0.464 
  (0.090)  (0.109)*  (0.134)*  (0.159)** 
The household's head is farmer  0.107  0.072  0.085  0.158 
  (0.124)  (0.165)  (0.224)  (0.240) 
Ethnic group : Pulaar  0.080  0.266  0.108  0.419 
  (0.132)  (0.158)+  (0.255)  (0.298) 
Ethnic group : Serere  -0.482  -0.268  -0.784  -0.449 
  (0.157)**  (0.165)  (0.212)**  (0.225)+ 
Ethnic group : Dioola  -0.673  -0.598  -0.973  -0.636 
  (0.216)**  (0.294)*  (0.252)**  (0.343)+ 
Ethnic group : Mandingue  0.047  0.187  0.161  0.266 
  (0.223)  (0.218)  (0.360)  (0.318) 
Ethnic group : Soninke  0.657  0.555  1.403  1.091 
  (0.295)*  (0.287)+  (0.593)*  (0.553)+ 
Ethnic group : Others  0.010  0.105  0.169  0.305 
  (0.207)  (0.224)  (0.396)  (0.434) 
Number of siblings (same mother)    0.034    0.092 
    (0.023)    (0.040)* 
Rank among sisters (same mother)    -0.100    -0.140 
    (0.035)**    (0.053)* 
Observations  1680  1140  1673  1137 
Constant  1.163  0.995  2.602  2.589 
  (0.305)**  (0.383)**  (0.508)**  (0.611)** 
log-likelihood  -1081.82  -725.83     
R-squared      0.06  0.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 17 
 
Table 3: The determinants of Koranic school attendance for boys 
 








Age  -0.042  -0.021  -0.080  -0.085 
  (0.047)  (0.061)  (0.098)  (0.129) 
Rural  -0.125  -0.300  0.279  0.060 
  (0.179)  (0.229)  (0.356)  (0.440) 
Wealth (Possession of durable goods)  0.106  0.163  0.586  0.723 
  (0.073)  (0.118)  (0.182)**  (0.340)* 
Father's Education  0.030  -0.010  -0.160  -0.183 
  (0.038)  (0.064)  (0.065)*  (0.109)+ 
Mother's Education  -0.011  -0.080  -0.128  -0.207 
  (0.050)  (0.094)  (0.118)  (0.174) 
The  household's  head  works  in  the  formal 
sector  -0.013  -0.033  -0.087  -0.122 
  (0.121)  (0.185)  (0.281)  (0.374) 
The household's head is farmer  0.019  0.116  -0.043  0.065 
  (0.189)  (0.247)  (0.366)  (0.513) 
Ethnic group : Pulaar  0.195  0.375  0.867  0.765 
  (0.149)  (0.193)+  (0.427)*  (0.494) 
Ethnic group : Serere  -0.907  -0.938  -1.377  -1.269 
  (0.143)**  (0.202)**  (0.309)**  (0.458)** 
Ethnic group : Dioola  -0.501  -0.683  -0.790  -0.809 
  (0.181)**  (0.230)**  (0.353)*  (0.455)+ 
Ethnic group : Mandingue  0.085  0.129  0.283  0.567 
  (0.290)  (0.336)  (0.560)  (0.668) 
Ethnic group : Soninke  0.315  0.694  0.587  1.886 
  (0.324)  (0.409)+  (1.295)  (0.970)+ 
Ethnic group : Others  0.013  0.724  -0.347  -0.683 
  (0.308)  (0.520)  (0.587)  (0.604) 
Number of siblings (same father)    0.023    0.072 
    (0.027)    (0.068) 
Number of brothers (same father)    -0.098    -0.248 
    (0.057)+    (0.105)* 
Rank among brothers (same father)    0.122    0.023 
    (0.056)*    (0.140) 
Number of older sisters (same father)    -0.175    -0.132 
    (0.044)**    (0.107) 
Observations  747  425  746  424 
log-likelihood  -454.12  -240.42     
R-squared      0.11  0.14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 18 
 
Koranic and formal schooling 
This section questions the articulation between Koranic and formal schools in Senegal. Does the 
duality of the education system represent a barrier to the universal primary education goal? We 
want  to  find  out  whether  parents  face  a  mutually  exclusive  choice  between  both  education 
systems. However it is likely that there exists a correlation between both demands for education. 
Therefore the fact that children attending formal school are more likely to be enrolled in Koranic 
school  as  well  does  not  answer  the  question.  The  empirical  strategy  developed  here  to 
circumvent the problem of unobservable individual characteristics, is to introduce the supply of 
formal education. What happens when a school opens in a particular place? The availability of 
formal schools provides us with a useful proxy for variations in the price of “formal” human 
capital. If parents sometimes need to make a choice between Koranic and formal education, the 
expected Koranic enrollment rate could marginally decline. It is the only exogenous shock at 
hand that could allow us to observe interactions between Koranic and formal schooling. Indeed, 
to  our  knowledge,  there  are  no  household  surveys  containing  information  on  the  supply  of 
Koranic education, given the informal nature of this system. Our dataset is probably one of the 
few  to  contain  simultaneously  information  on  formal  schooling,  Koranic  schooling  and  the 
supply of formal education in a developing country.  
First, we will give the economic intuitions explaining why our results do give an answer to a 
relevant public policy issue. Second, we describe the correlations between Koranic and formal 
school outputs, and finally provide the IV results which take causality into account. 
Substitution and revenue effects 
Let  us  consider  two  goods:  the  formal  and  Koranic  human  capitals.  In  the  standard 
microeconomic  model,  the  Slutsky  equation  decomposes  the  cross-price  derivatives  of  the 
optimal accumulation of human capital function of the prices of goods. It allows us to define 
whether the Koranic human capital demand will increase or decrease when the price of formal 
human capital decreases, differentiating between substitution and income effects. 
The first  term  (the derivative  of the  Hicksian  demand) represents the  substitution effect.  Its 
economic meaning is as follows. Suppose a formal school opens. If Koranic and formal schools 
are substitutes, parents will substitute Koranic for formal school, which became less expensive 19 
 
per “unit of human capital”, and as a result, children will be less likely to go to Koranic school. 
Conversely, if gaining formal human capital adds value to the Koranic human capital -e.g. they 
are complementary goods- the opening of a formal school will increase Koranic schooling. The 
substitution effect has an interesting symmetric property
40, i.e. if the opening of e formal school 
decreases Koranic schooling by substitution, then the opening of a Koranic school will decrease 
formal schooling. 
The other term, called income effect, can also be easily interpreted in our case.   Let‟s suppose 
that a formal school opens. For children who would have gone to formal school anyways, travel 
time decreases, so that the time constraint slacks off. As a result, it could induce an increase in 
the length of Koranic schooling as free time generated can be reallocated to other activities. The 
income  effect  however  is  not  symmetric  under  reasonable  hypotheses.  In  other  words,  the 
opening  of  a  Koranic  school  would  probably  not  quantitatively  generate  the  same  time  re-
allocation towards formal school. 
Nevertheless, the sign of this effect is almost certainly known. It is positive for normal goods: its 
consumption increases with income. It is realistic to assume that human capital is not an inferior 
good, so that the income effect is positive. Inferior goods usually are vital goods such as staples 
that wealthier consumers prefer to substitute for more expensive and more appealing food. In the 
Sahelian context it is very likely that human capital is a normal good, making the income effect 
positive. Time spent in Koranic school is likely to increase as budget constraint is released. 
In the end, we observe the sum of both the substitution and the income effects in this article of 
the decrease of the price of formal school on Koranic schooling. Suppose that the opening of a 
formal  school  decreases  Koranic  schooling.  In  regards  to  what  was  previously  described,  it 
implies that the substitution effect dominates and must have been negative as the income effect 
would  have  rather  increased  Koranic  schooling.  Even  so,  this  doesn‟t  imply  that  Koranic 
schooling  would  have  decreased  formal  schooling.  If  many  children  were  already  attending 
                                                 
40 This is technically true if the utility function is “sufficiently” differentiable.   20 
 
Koranic school, the income effect would have allowed them to attend both at the same time. 
Theoretically, this effect could dominate the substitution effect.
41 
In our case, the relevant public policy question is precis ely not to know whether openings of 
Koranic schools would hinder universal primary schooling. Laws cannot regulate Koranic school 
as it belongs to the informal sector: it does not seem feasible   neither desirable  to ban the 
openings of Koranic schools or to close existing ones. The relevant question is rather to know to 
which extend it is possible to combine both education systems and whether it prevents formal 
schooling.  If the opening of formal schools decreases Koranic schooling, it means there is 
substitution between both systems, and that the substitution effect overrides the income effect. 
This  means  that  parents  didn‟t  choose  to  combine  both  education  systems,  which  in  turns 
suggests that both systems are hard to combine. Public action in favor of better integration of 
both systems would consequently promote universal primary schooling. 
Correlations between formal and Koranic school attendance 
Though, as we mentioned earlier, I.V. regressions are the only ones which would enable us to 
identify  the  link  between  Koranic  and  formal  schooling.  Finding  out  whether  there  is  a 
correlation between Koranic and formal schooling is of real interest. It gives indeed some insight 
on the link between both education systems and on their potential common determinants.  
                                                 
41 On practical grounds however, the opening of a Koranic school could only marginally release the time or budget 
constraint, so that the income effect may not be significant. 21 
 
Figure 3: Formal school attendance and time spent in Koranic school for boys and girls 
 
Figure 3 gives the formal school enrollment rates for girls older than 15 and boys older than 18. 
Both curves display an inverted-U shape. The children who have never been to Koranic school 
have a lower formal school enrollment rate than those who have been a few years in Koranic 
school. 66% of the girls with no Koranic education have attended formal school, and 85% of the 
girls with one year of Koranic education (respectively 84% and 94% for boys). However, if a 
few years spent in Koranic school do not seem to be a deterrent to formal school enrollment, the 
proportion of children having attended formal school decreases significantly after 3 years of 
Koranic schooling for girls and 4 years for boys. 
However, Figure 3 does not give any precise information about the effect of Koranic education 
on formal education. In reality, the demand for Koranic education and the demand for formal 
education are likely to be highly correlated. A robust result we obtain though is that Koranic and 
formal education are by far not incompatible. 
It is rather impossible to draw any conclusion concerning the causality from this figure. The 
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conclusion on their potential complementarity or substitution. For instance, it could be that some 
children, notably girls, could be excluded from any schooling system for financial reasons. This 
would explain why for these children Koranic and formal schooling are correlated. Tables 6 and 
7 in the appendix show multinomial logit models, which allows checking whether this inverted 
U-shape is robust to the inclusion of control variables and it is not the result of omitted ones. 
However, it remains that a correlation between the demands for Koranic and formal education 
causes an endogeneity bias in the coefficient of these tables. Only I.V. estimations can give us 
unbiased results.  
Effect of the opening of formal schools on Koranic school attendance 
Our instrumental strategy to study the interaction between Koranic and formal schooling relies 
on  the  opening  of  formal  schools.  The  dataset  contains  detailed  information  about  formal 
schools, among which the opening year for (nearly) all the (formal) schools in each community. 
This provides us with a relevant identification strategy: in each community, we compare children 
who are too old to have benefited from the opening of schools with the younger ones. We expect 
that in communities where a school opened, the difference in the school enrollments between 
cohorts is larger than in the rest of the country. This double difference (between cohorts and 
between communities) allows us to identify the substitution effect between Koranic and formal 
schools. If whenever a formal school opens affected cohorts are less inclined to go to Koranic 
school, it would show that it is sometimes costly to simultaneously cumulate both schooling 
systems.  
Before turning to the effects of the openings of formal schools on Koranic schooling, we start by 
checking that they do affect formal schooling. Estimation results are displayed in table 4. It is 
actually  the  first  stage  of  our  identification  strategy.  The  table  displays  different  model 
specifications numbered 1 to 8.
42 In order to have reasonable sample size, we focused on 15 to 
21 year-old children. This decision doesn‟t affect the interpretation of table 4 as the oldest school 
entry age is 11 in the EBMS data. 
                                                 
42  This  numbering  will  be  used  in  the  second  stage  of  the  bivariate  probit  model  (table  5)  to  indicate  which 
specification has been used in the first stage. 23 
 
We run a regression of formal school attendance of a child
43 on the number of formal schools 
which  opened  before  she  reached  a  given  age .  It  controls  for  school  fixed  effects  a  la 
Chamberlain  (1980),  (i.e.  it  controls  for  th e  community  mean  of  these  variables)  so  the 
regression  compares  the  enrollment  between  different  cohorts  in  each  community.  The 
introduction of age dummies controls for the national time trend in school enrollments. 
Table 4: Effect of the opening of formal schools on formal school enrollment 
  girls  Boys 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Number of primary or secondary 
schools which opened before the girl 
reached 9 
    0,05  0,14*         
    (0,06)  (0,07)         
Number of primary or secondary 
schools which opened before the child 
reached 10 
0,12+  0,14      0,21*  0,19     
(0,07)  (0,09) 
 
  (0,10)  (0,12)     
Number of secondary schools which 
opened before the boy reached 11 
            0,34*  0,33* 
            (0,15)  (0,16) 
Mean of this number in the 
community  
-0,44**  -0,35**  -0,27**  -0,34**  -0,42**  -0,40**  -0,78**  -0,78** 
(0,16)  (0,11)  (0,10)  (0,08)  (0,14)  (0,13)  (0,22)  (0,20) 
Control variables  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  1816  1726  1816  1726  1933  1848  1933  1848 
log-likelihood  -1020,5  -727,3  -1019,4  -725,7  -749,6  -636,5  -745,9  -635,9 
 
Notes: Probit model. Dependant variable: enrollment in a formal school for at least one year. Robust standard errors 
clustered by community in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * at 5%; ** at 1%. Control variables: age, wealth, the 
household's head works in the formal sector, the household's head is farmer, age and ethnic group dummies. 
 
These results show that formal school openings do increase the probability of being sent to one. 
The effect remains significantly positive after the introduction of cohort effects and the mean 
number of school openings in the community since an arbitrary date.  However the effect is not 
always significant depending on the model specification: the estimators are rather imprecise. 
Therefore, the effect of formal school openings on Koranic schooling will also be imprecise, as 
we will see below. 
                                                 
43 Attending at least one year of formal school. 24 
 
Table 5 estimates the effect of formal schooling instrumented by the formal school openings on 
Koranic schooling. We estimate this effect on all children from 15 to 21, bearing the risk of 
having boys still enrolled which can alter our estimations. 
The simple probit models in columns (a) and (h) basically sums up previous findings already 
illustrated in figure 3. Hence girls who have been 1 year or more to Koranic school have the 
same probability of attending formal school as the ones who have never been to Koranic school. 
The reason is that girls who have been to Koranic school are of two types. On the one hand, 
those who have been to Koranic school for a short time only and have a high formal school 
enrollment. On the other hand, those who have followed long Koranic schooling and who were 
less likely to attend formal school. It can be seen down below in column (a) that the ones who 
have been for over 5 years to Koranic school are the ones who are the least likely to have 
attended formal school. 
 
Columns (b), (e), (i) and (l) present bivariate probit models where formal school attendance has 
been instrumented by the number of formal school openings and its mean in the community, as 
in model (1) below: 
 
  (1) 
The instrument is here a measure of the supply of formal education in the community. If this 
instrument is endogenous due to the fact that schools are more likely to open in some areas that 
have some specificity in terms of Koranic schooling, then the instrument is not valid. 
In  these  four  estimations,  the  substitution  effect  between  Koranic  and  formal  schooling  is 
stronger  than  in  the  simple  probit  one.  For  girls,  it  becomes  negative  when  simple  probit 
estimation  gave  a  zero  coefficient,  although  it  is  not  always  significant  due  to  the  weak 
estimation precision. For boys, the coefficient estimations are always negative but much stronger 
and constant with Koranic school duration, while they were increasing in absolute value in the 
simple probit model. 
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Tableau 4: Effet of formal school openings on Koranic schooling, bivariate probit models 
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n
Simple 
Probit
(2) (1) (2) (4) (3) (4)
Simple 
Probit
(6) (5) (6) (8) (7) (8)
0,08 -0,82+ -1,09** 0,51 -0,74 -1,06** 0,54 -0,197** -1,45** -1,39** -1,24** -1,47** -0,90 -1,18*
(0,09) (0,46) (0,3) (0,43) (0,50) (0,31) (0,43) (0,10) (0,19) (0,32) (0,42) (0,18) (1,91) (0,58)
-0,03 -0,98** -1,15** 0,3 -0,95** -1,14** 0,36 -0,33** -1,44** -1,40** 0,28 -1,37** -0,59 0,38
(0,10) (0,33) (0,31) (0,46) (0,35) (0,29) (0,46) (0,09) (0,26) (0,38) (1,8) (0,33) (1,46) (1,04)
-0,18+ -0,78+ -1,16** 0,43 -0,77+ -1,21** 0,47 -0,59** -1,60** -0,98 -0,4 -1,54** -1,03 -0,26
(0,10) (0,40) (0,49) (0,40) (0,41) (0,38) (0,41) (0,09) (0,19) (0,66) (1,23) (0,25) (1,13) (1,18)
-0,29** -0,63 -0,99 0,57 -0,64 -1,1+ 0,59 -0,83** -1,60** -0,63 -0,29 -1,58** 0,49 0,06
(0,09) (0,47) (0,92) (0,38) (0,47) (0,66) (0,38) (0,09) (0,24) (1,11) (0,96) (0,27) (1,68) (1,04)
-0,32** -0,69* -0,37 0,06 -0,69* -0,68 0,11 -0,94** -1,60** -1,26 -0,42 -1,36** -1,42 -0,27
(0,10) (0,34) (2,35) (-0,34) (0,35) (1,36) (0,34) (0,09) (0,25) (0,91) (0,87) (0,43) (1,26) (1,58)
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No No Yes No No
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
1649 1649 1736 1649 1649 1736 1649 1771 1771 1853 1771 1771 1853 1771
girls boys
1 year or more












































































The number of school openings 
is an instrument
The mean number of school 
openings in the community is an 
instrument
4 years or more
3 years or more
5 years or more
 
Notes: Bivariate probit models predicting the probability of attending at least one year of formal school on one hand and on the other hand the probability of 
attending over n years in Koranic school (n between 1 and 5, depending on the line). Only the coefficient of the effect of going to the formal school on the 
Koranic schooling is displayed. Control variables: age, wealth, the household's head works in the formal sector, the household's head is farmer, age and ethnic 
group dummies in the simple probit model. The mean number of school openings is always included as an additional explanatory variable in both steps when it is 
not an instrument. Sample :children over 15 years old. Robust standard errors clustered by community in parenthesis. + significant at 10%; * at 5%; ** at 1%. 26 
 
Columns (c), (d), (f), (g), (j), (k), (m) and (n) present bivariate probit models where formal 
school attendance has been instrumented by the number of formal school openings affecting the 




This time, the estimator is not threatened to be biased by the endogeneity of school opening 
process.  We  compare  children  from  the  same  community  before  and  after  school  opening. 
Nevertheless, estimations are way more imprecise. Since a school opening poorly influences 
school enrollments, there is little information available to estimate the substitution effect. 
For both boys and girls it is noticeable that coefficients are often poorly significant. For boys, 
few coefficients are significantly different from zero. It is the case for the first year of Koranic 
schooling: they remain significantly negative. Elsewhere the coefficients are usually negative but 
the imprecision is so important that it is difficult to conclude. 
For girls, the coefficient is negative and significant for the three first lines of columns (c) and (f). 
Nevertheless, in the following columns (d) and (g), the coefficients become insignificant with the 
introduction of control variables. This should not be the case that control variables affect the 
coefficients. I.V. estimators should not be affected by the omitted variable bias. One possible 
explanation is then that there is a selection bias for girls due to early marriages in our sample. 
Girls get married at younger ages when they haven‟t been to school, which generates a different 
selection when a school opens. This difference between boys and girls stems from the fact that 
boys marry older than girls and they traditionally stay in their parents‟ home while girls move in 
their husband‟s home.
46 Regressions on younger samples were run and are given in the appendix 
(tables  8  and  9).  Results  are  once  again  ambiguous.  The  substitution  effect  is  significantly 
negative  with  control  variables  but  non-significant  without,  even  though  the  introduction  of 
control variables shouldn‟t affect the coefficient. 
                                                 
46 Wolof and Haalpulaaren societies (at least) are virilocal.  
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Overall, the dominant effect seems to be a substitution between Koranic and formal schooling, in 
particular for boys. 
 Conclusions 
Thanks  to  a  unique  Senegalese  dataset  containing  information  on  both  formal  and  Koranic 
schoolings  in  a  national  household  survey,  we  were  able  to  analyze  with  scrutiny  the  link 
between both schooling institutions away from ideological debates and stereotypes. Indeed mass 
media tend to focus on Koranic students begging in the streets assimilating them with the plague 
of street children. However this tends to distort the image of Koranic school which can take 
many different forms. 
In the sample about half of the girls and 60% of the boys attend Koranic school, but the vast 
majority attends it for 2 to 3 years. Only a third of the boys having attended Koranic schools 
continued after 3 years and only half of this proportion for girls. The dominance of boys in 
Koranic school probably reflects the prevalence of men in Islam. Koranic schooling of girls 
appears to be a more recent phenomenon. This could be linked to women‟s empowerment in 
recent years which resulted in higher school attendance for girls in both systems. 
When further analyzing the determinants of Koranic schooling, we found the following main 
results. A wealth effect seems to affect Koranic schooling duration, as for poorer households, the 
opportunity cost of schooling may be higher as there is a larger child labor demand (mainly for 
domestic chores). We also found that father‟s formal education for boys and household head 
working in the formal sector for girls decreases Koranic school duration.  Another important 
result  consistent  with  the  idea  that  Koranic  schooling  decisions  are  embedded  in  a  cultural 
context  is that ethnic group variables represent  a strong determinant  of both  attendance and 
duration of Koranic education. 
More interesting still is the link between both institutions. Simple descriptive statistics show that 
both  systems  can  indeed  coexist.  A  simple scatter  plot  reveals  an  inverted-U  shape  relation 
between years of Koranic schooling and formal school enrollment rates. However, these results 
do not account for the potential correlation between Koranic and formal schooling decisions. 
Indeed,  our  I.V.  estimation  results  based  on  school  openings  show  that  substitution  effects 
dominate. 28 
 
This substitution is somewhat surprising, as the increase in formal school enrolment associated 
with the opening of a new formal school could increase in part-time Koranic enrolment. So it is 
probably the case that both kinds of education are not fully differentiated for some Senegalese 
households. This choice between two different school careers appears to be contradictory with 
reaching the Millennium Development Goals,  as one of them do not provide with the basic 
capabilities given by primary education. 29 
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Appendix 
Table 6: The determinants of years spent in Koranic school for girls, multinomial logit specification 
Time spent in Koranic 
school  1 year  2 years  3 years  4 years  5 years  6 years or 
more 
Rural 
-0.754  -0.291  -0.443  0.164  -0.220  -0.155 
(0.245)**  (0.272)  (0.324)  (0.319)  (0.403)  (0.451) 
Father's Education 
0.069  0.093  -0.002  0.001  -0.001  -0.003 
(0.075)  (0.063)  (0.056)  (0.073)  (0.118)  (0.084) 
Mother's Education 
0.138  0.025  0.048  0.115  0.020  0.155 
(0.060)*  (0.067)  (0.081)  (0.092)  (0.193)  (0.116) 
Has ever been enrolled 
in a formal school 
1.088  0.581  0.202  -0.436  0.070  -1.340 
(0.331)**  (0.281)*  (0.404)  (0.517)  (0.568)  (0.474)** 
Last grade in formal 
school 
-0.065  -0.042  0.016  0.053  -0.021  0.099 
(0.048)  (0.038)  (0.054)  (0.066)  (0.080)  (0.069) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by community in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. The reference is no Koranic education. Other covariates: age, wealth, the household's head works 
in the formal sector, the household's head is farmer, ethnic dummies. 
 
Table 7: The determinants of years spent in Koranic school for boys, multinomial logit specification 
Time spent in Koranic 
school  1 year  2 years  3 years or 
more 
Rural 
-1.025  -0.163  -0.045 
(0.423)*  (0.297)  (0.275) 
Father's Education 
0.167  0.004  -0.025 
(0.058)**  (0.049)  (0.039) 
Mother's Education 
-0.002  0.033  -0.030 
(0.119)  (0.079)  (0.070) 
Has ever been enrolled in 
a formal school 
1.279  0.663  -0.954 
(0.453)**  (0.375)+  (0.270)** 
Last grade in formal 
school 
-0.074  -0.014  0.038 
(0.041)+  (0.036)  (0.029) 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by community in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%. The reference is no Koranic education. Other covariates: age, wealth, the household's head works 
in the formal sector, the household's head is farmer, ethnic dummies. 32 
 
Table 8: Effect of formal school opening on formal schooling of girls aged between 11 and 14 years old 
  girls 
(1)  (2) 
Number of primary schools which 
opened before the girl reached 11 
0,45**  0,588** 
(0,13)  (0,198) 
Mean of this number in the 
community 
-0,07  0,00 
(0,37)  (0,40) 
Control variables  No  Yes 
Observations  1190  1133 
log-likelihood  -572,7  -465,8 
 




-0,05 -1,44** -0,27 -1,46**
(0,14) (0,24) (0,98) (0,18)
-0,18 -1,67** 0,60 -1,68**
(0,15) (0,12) (0,68) (0,12)
-0,35* -1,80** 0,55 -1,81**
(0,16) (0,23) (0,85) (0,23)
No Yes Yes Yes
Yes No No
Yes Yes No Yes
1111 1111 1166 1111
3 years or more
Observations
The number of school openings is an 
instrument
The mean number of school openings in the 
community is an instrument
Control variables 
girls















































































1 year or more
2 years or more
 
Notes: Bivariate probit models predicting the probability of attending at least one year of formal school on one hand 
and on the other hand the probability of attending over n years in Koranic school (n between 1 and 3, depending on 
the line). Only the coefficient of the effect of going to the formal school on the Koranic schooling is displayed. 
Control variables: age, wealth, the household's head works in the formal sector, the household's head is farmer, age 
and ethnic group dummies in the simple probit model. The mean number of school openings is always included as 
an additional explanatory variable in both steps when it is not an instrument. Sample: girls between 11 and 14 years 
old. Robust standard errors clustered by community in parenthesis. + significant at 10%; * at 5%; ** at 1%. 
 